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RECOMMENDATIONS
\ Regain an active role for the United 
Nations in present negotiations
The mission of the UN Special Envoy de Mistura can 
regain traction if supported by a new UN Security 
Council resolution and by offering to opposition forces 
and Russia as the main guarantor behind the Syrian 
government to freeze the military status quo through 
UN troops.
\ Ensure and monitor a needs-based 
distribution of humanitarian aid 
The unprecedented scale of displacement has created 
a high dependency on aid, yet aid distribution has 
strongly privileged areas under government control. 
Pull-effects of populations towards those areas 
where aid is accessible have been the result. The 
presence of UN troops would not only safeguard 
safe return by those displaced, but it could also help 
ensuring a readjustment of imbalances in aid.
\ Refrain from establishing small-scale 
safe areas in the border territory
Small-scale safe zones could prompt unpredictable 
mass movement towards these zones, which would 
further enhance IDPs vulnerability to attack. Equally, 
small-scale safe zones would neither resolve the 
hardships of forced displacement nor would they 
protect millions of civilians at risk from attack 
throughout the country.  
\ Establish a countrywide no-fly zone
The protection of civilians remains an urgent task 
in Syria. Mass atrocities may resume if the political 
impasse is not overcome. While the government’s 
allies have gained significant ground with the fall 
of Aleppo, those who remain in opposition areas, 
and the governorate of Idlib in particular, face an 
immediate risk of mass-scale assault. In these areas, 
targeted aerial attacks on civilian neighbourhoods and 
infrastructure persist notwithstanding the present 
ceasefire. A no-fly zone exempting the country’s 
IS-controlled east is the only effective means of 
preventing a military resolution of the conflict, which 
may result in mass atrocities. 
\ Achieve agreement on a UN  
mandate for peacekeeping troops
Given that all parties to the war have continuously 
violated the provisions of international humanitarian 
law, none of these actors should be entrusted with 
the task of preventing atrocities on the ground. 
While a conflict of interests is likely to erupt between 
Russia, Hezbollah and Iran as for their respective 
roles in Syria’s political future, neither of these forces 
could secure that a renewed escalation of violence is 
prevented.
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Upcoming peace negotiations in Geneva 
The upcoming Syria negotiations in Geneva on 20 
February 2017 may prove fundamental in deciding on 
its future. For Syria’s armed and civilian opposition 
groups, which number in their thousands, the pros-
pects are bleak. In the face of the recent fall of Aleppo, 
ongoing atrocities and profound exhaustion, the need 
for the protection of civilians has never been greater. 
Although officially, a ceasefire remains in place,  
attacks continue especially in the governorate of Idlib. 
For the UN and the European Union, the Geneva talks 
represent a rare opportunity to regain a foothold in a 
process in which they have been sidelined. Russia is 
closer to enforcing the ceasefire than in previous 
rounds of negotiations due to military gains. But par-
adoxically, its collaboration with Iran and Hezbollah 
on the battlefield translates into looming conflict. 
Neither party could safeguard peace on their own. At 
this point, the renewed debate on establishing safe 
zones in Syria may prove key to reaching a compro-
mise. The one option that would require significant 
commitment but also benefits to all sides but the gov-
ernment and so-called Islamic State, is the agreement 
on a countrywide no-fly zone secured by UN troops 
on the ground. 
Forced displacement highlights  
vulnerability
Given the course of the Syrian war, the notion of safe 
zones does speak to overwhelming needs. In Syria, 
the brutality of war is expressed in the magnitude of 
forced displacement. While an estimated 470,000 are 
thought to have lost their lives due to the war, more 
than 10 million out of a pre-war total of 21 million 
people have been forced to flee. This is a scale unprec-
edented. Hard numbers of battle deaths, especially if 
including high numbers of civilians, could long have 
prompted a military response internationally, but  
denial of mass atrocities is part of the information 
war surrounding Syria. Mass displacement is much 
harder to assign responsibility for, and even the worst 
of human suffering affecting millions has not swayed 
any state power or international alliance in the inter-
national community to step in for their protection. 
Furthermore, the chaos triggered by millions on the 
move renders it much more difficult to gather evi-
dence for the legal prosecution of war crimes. 
In Syria, continuous and blatant violations of the  
obligation of belligerents to protect civilian lives have 
long reached a stage that requires urgent and efficient 
action. This includes mass displacement, a highly  
uneven distribution of aid disadvantaging opposition 
areas and the lack of protection for civilians and pris-
oners of war alike. As a result of pressing needs, safe 
zones are likely to pull highly vulnerable populations 
towards these areas. 
Forced displacement in Syria has taken two major 
forms: Instances where locals are forced to flee, but 
where they take their decision on where to seek ref-
uge and situations in which belligerents do not only 
force local communities to flee, but they also system-
atically orchestrate the selection of those expelled, 
their subsequent move, and forced relocation. Aerial 
bombardments of residential neighbourhoods by the 
Syrian and Russian air forces or ground demolitions 
bulldozing thousands of homes in different parts of 
the country thus aim to drive local populations out of 
areas under the enemies’ control (UNITAR, 2014). 
Armed opposition groups do not possess the means 
for aerial attacks, but they have equally destroyed or 
occupied land and property or threatened to do so to 
enforce a pledge of political allegiance or religious 
conversion. In cases where belligerents are keen to 
maintain control over civilians, however, these have 
also found themselves forced to stay, and killings of 
those trying to flee have been documented through-
out the war. Forced relocations, on the other hand, 
mostly occur in situations of siege, where 
starve-or-surrender-tactics continue to be employed 
as an illicit means of engineering “evacuations” 
(Siege Watch, 2016). As of now, 700,000 people remain 
under conditions of siege in the country. Of these, 13 
sieges are currently held by the government and its 
allies, two by non-state forces, and one by so-called 
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IS.1 Forced relocations have been utilized to separate 
civilians from fighters, but also to repopulate areas 
otherwise deserted in the newly gained territory to 
bolster control, e.g. when the IS group seized control of 
formerly Kurdish villages in northern Syria in 2013, 
settling the areas with Sunni Arabs (UN, 2014).  This 
practice has recently been extended to include the 
settlement of foreign communities: About 300 Iraqi 
(Shi’ite) families were settled into areas formerly in-
habited by Sunnis in Darayya and Muadamiyat al-Sh-
am immediately after opposition forces had left  
(Picali, 2016). Civilians thus often face collective “pun-
ishment” with different triggers that can change be-
tween ethnicity, religion and political convictions de-
pending on which armed group will seek or gain 
control. In Syria, displacement is thus no mere 
side-effect to war, but it has been utilized systemati-
cally to instrumentalize the composition and geo-
graphical distribution of Syria’s local communities by 
sheer force. 
A conscious lack of solutions:  
Aid imbalances and further protection 
needs
The Syrian government has most staunchly opposed 
the call for the establishment of safe zones. While it 
has established several collective shelters primarily 
in public buildings such as schools, the vast majority 
of 6.3 million IDPs remain in rented apartments or 
with hosts, often in severely damaged or unfinished 
buildings. By 2016, only about one million IDPs lived 
in collective shelters or small camps; 4.9 million had 
left the country as refugees altogether. Despite pressing 
needs, the government has not permitted the estab-
lishment of large-scale IDP camps. Where small 
camps do exist, these are often under the control of 
armed groups with no standards in place, with no 
regular access to humanitarian aid, and with no over-
sight by experienced INGOs. In short, the government 
has focused its efforts on improving the lives of popu-
lations under its direct control, while being 
1 \ The categorization of what areas should be counted as being under 
siege, though, has been fiercely contested, and it excludes all those 
living in areas considered as hard-to-reach.
responsible for targeting those living elsewhere and 
aggravating their plight. For the Syrian government, 
the direct or indirect enforcement of populations 
moving towards areas under its control is a paramount 
objective. It will, therefore, perceive safe zones as a 
threat.
Populations suffering forced displacement are par-
ticularly vulnerable because displacement increases 
their dependency on humanitarian aid. With regular 
livelihoods collapsing and social ties being cut, 13.5 
million out of about 16 million remaining in the 
country are in need of humanitarian aid to survive. 
The humanitarian response has effectively been  
divided into humanitarian deliveries going to  
government areas and those reaching opposition 
territory largely through cross-border aid from  
Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. Owing to the fact that the 
government has systematically cut opposition-held 
areas off aid, UN Resolutions 2139, 2165, 2191, 2258 
and 2332 have allowed for humanitarian aid deliver-
ies even without the permission of the government, 
which has been in continuous breach of its legal  
responsibility to safeguard the survival of its own 
population even in the state of war. Nonetheless, the 
overwhelming majority of the international aid  
response continues to reach government-controlled 
areas, while the impact and reach of cross-border 
aid remains difficult to gauge. Though the govern-
ment’s impact on blocking aid is most severely felt 
through access denial for aid deliveries to areas it 
holds under siege, the withholding of safety guaran-
tees, bureaucratic hurdles or government forces  
removing tens of thousands of medical equipment 
items from aid convoys each month, belligerents on 
all sides have interfered with aid deliveries, and so-
called IS has largely denied deliveries altogether 
(Meininghaus, 2016).
Attacks on humanitarian convoys have so far claimed 
the lives of scores of aid workers, most recently in  
attacks on an Arab Red Crescent distribution centre 
in Hamadaniyya. In a similar vein, civilian infrastruc-
ture such as hospitals, schools and bakeries has been 
targeted throughout the war, leaving local populations 
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the past, no-fly zones have been authorized by the UN 
Security Council in northern Iraq (1991, 2003), in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1993, 1995) and in Libya in 2011. 
No-fly zones are relatively low risk for the intervening 
powers. A no-fly zone involves regular air sorties, mis-
sions flown either uninterrupted throughout the dura-
tion of the enforcement, during certain periods of the 
day or only on certain days of the week, and it might be 
assisted by unmanned aerial vehicles, i.e. drones. No-fly 
zones serve as an alternative to ground forces. Nonethe-
less, they can help friendly troops on the ground as air 
cover, too. Most importantly, they can function as a 
buffer between hostile groups or deter the intrusion of 
destructive military forces. If a no-fly zone works in a 
particular area, it could be expanded later on to larger 
parts or the whole country—wherever civilians need 
protection. Without ground forces, a no-fly zone is only 
effective when perpetrator forces are readily identifiable 
and targetable. There are thus limits to no-fly zones, too, 
for example, air superiority is not effective against light 
infantry units or militias in mountainous or densely 
populated terrain. But even in these circumstances, ir-
regular armed forces or regular platoons on the ground 
would have to take the presence of air superiority into 
account—it has a deterring and thus potentially pre-
ventive effect.
A more intrusive form of protecting civilians is the em-
powerment of indigenous ground military forces, as 
happened with Kurdish Peshmergas receiving Western 
training and weaponry to protect Yazidis fleeing from 
IS attacks. As the Syrian experience shows, enabling 
“friendly” ground forces is risky, because arms may  
proliferate, empowered groups could be on the loose, 
and finally, there is limited control over the abuse of 
military power. Nonetheless, the kind of weaponry  
delivered and the interaction between the external air 
force and local ground forces may create mutual  
dependencies that inhibit ground forces to break lose. 
Finally, a safe area may also involve foreign troops on 
the ground, even though this is a prospect most coun-
tries currently loath due to intervention fatigue. 
with little or no resort to seeking medical assistance, 
exposed to hunger and living in constant fear. Children 
continue to count among the victims of attacks, and 
they are at particular risk to suffer injuries and 
maiming from landmines and unexploded remnants 
of war with which 88 per cent of sub-districts sur-
veyed by UNMAS were found to be contaminated in 
2016. Child abuse and child labour are among the 
greatest protection concerns, as are different forms of 
gender- based violence for women, while boys and 
men face the constant risk of forced conscription or 
detention (Whole of Syria, 2016). In theory, safe zones 
would thus represent safe havens that end repeated 
cycles of displacement, offer physical protection and 
ensure that humanitarian needs can be met. In prac-
tice, however, the sheer scale of needs and the poten-
tial response of belligerents to the establishment of 
such areas raise severe protection concerns. 
Safe areas: No-fly zones and  
ground forces
Aleppo signifies the failure of R2P as a norm and a set of 
practical measures, but the horror underscores the 
need to revive the concept. Below the level of direct mil-
itary intervention for humanitarian purposes, which 
would legally require a UN Security Council resolution, 
more restrained, but effective measures need to be con-
sidered to prevent further atrocities from happening in 
Syria in the forthcoming months and years. The Syrian 
government did not fulfil its duty to protect its citizens 
according to the World Summit Outcome Document of 
2005 on the Responsibility to Protect. When a state and 
its allies willfully slaughter civilians, they forfeit certain 
rights under state sovereignty. Due to Russia’s and China’s 
obstructionist policies in the UN Security Council, no 
protecting mechanisms could be enforced thus far. 
Thus other options need to be considered. 
Since 2012, the Turkish government has repeatedly 
called for safe zones inside Syria to create safe havens 
for refugees and internally displaced persons. No-fly 
zones would be the least intrusive form of safe areas, 
which would prevent the aerial bombing of civilians. In 
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country whose borders with the Lebanon, Iraq and 
Turkey have effectively collapsed. Russia may or may 
not continue to hold on to Assad if the costs for doing 
so become too high, but a decades-long drawn out 
war is certainly not in its interest. The opposition will 
not accept a government that is led by Assad or domi-
nated by the old elites, but it may agree to lay down 
weapons rather than engaging in a protracted war if 
the worst of mass atrocities were ended, and the pro-
tection civilians was mandated and thus guaranteed.
A no-fly zone is effectively already in place in the 
border region with Turkey. Similar suggestions have 
been made for the border with Jordan. However, 
large-scale camps for civilians do not exist yet. Very 
small safe areas in Syria even incur significant risks. 
And one has to be aware that protection needs exceed 
potential capacities by far. It is unclear how many ref-
ugees would return to Syria if safe zones were to be 
established—they could be thousands or millions. 
Safe passage would have to be secured for those 
seeking refuge, or else their transit would leave them 
exposed to attack. The threat of mass atrocities by  
belligerents targeting safe zones would persist even if 
ground forces were put in place. In the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ground troops in the Operation ‘Deny 
Flight’ possessed neither heavy weaponry nor authority 
to contain the Serb forces. In one infamous instance, 
350 UN peacekeepers were seized and handcuffed. In 
a separate incident leading up to the July 1995 
Srebrenica Massacre, several hundred Dutch peace-
keepers were taken hostage by Bosnian Serb forces. 
UN safe zones were, in fact, anything but safe (Benar, 
2004). Small-scale safe zones might also be misused 
by opposition fighters to gain strength, to coordinate 
fighting or to recruit soldiers among those displaced. 
Where small-scale safe areas are maintained for an 
extended period of time, they exacerbate a process of 
territorial fragmentation. 
A countrywide no-fly zone—except the anti-ISIS 
zone—is the only option that would help to secure ci-
vilian protection at a proportionate scale. The division 
of the country into four different zones—a government 
zone, a Free Syrian Army zone, a Kurdish zone and the 
Safe areas in Syria?
In Syria, a no-fly zone covering all of the country but 
IS-controlled territory would protect civilians from 
aerial bombardment and inhibit massive ground  
assault. In this way, a no-fly zone could help breaking 
the cycle of multiple displacements and further 
mass-scale destruction. It would require a unified 
command among those air, ground or maritime 
forces enforcing it and rules of authorization in defined 
key situations. Further, the conditions, the duration 
and individual obligations under a no-fly zone man-
date would need to be specified. In practice, a no-fly 
zone would pose the gravest threat to the Syrian gov-
ernment thus far for its ground advances have been 
strongly dependent on Russian air cover. 
A no-fly zone in Syria would decisively depend on the 
active cooperation of Russia in its enforcement.
Russia would be in a position to keep the Syrian air 
force grounded and to refrain from any aerial attacks— 
except eastern Syria, where the anti-IS alliance would 
still conduct air sorties against the Islamic State 
group. Given the military to military information 
sharing and even cooperation in Syria among other-
wise non-cooperative outside powers—Israelis, 
Americans, Turks and Russians share information 
about their respective flight patterns in Syria—some 
logistical basis to build upon for a no-fly zone would 
already exist. While striving for being recognized as a 
broker of peace since the recent talks in Astana/
Kazakhstan, Russia may take an interest in proffering 
a humanitarian image. If so, it may present itself as 
an inclusive protector rather than the perpetrator of 
one-sided violence. Otherwise, it is likely to become 
hostage to its alliance with the Syrian government 
and Iran—and the gains of these alliances are tac-
tical, but not strategic in the long run. 
At the same time, though, Russia is likely to only en-
dorse such an approach if it can secure its vision of 
Syria, in which it competes as a protecting force of 
the same client as do Iran and Hezbollah: The govern-
ment. The deployment of blue helmets would repre-
sent the only safe option for civilian protection from 
further atrocities, but it would also aid in stabilizing a 
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east currently controlled by IS—is no alternative,  
because it is unrealistic given the fragmentation of 
the terrain and competition among hundreds of mili-
tary forces on the ground. It would further raise the 
question as to which air forces or, if it came to that, 
troops would act as protectors of the FSA and Kurdish 
groups. A no-fly zone with the purpose to protect  
civilians is costly and risky, but with a view on the 
long-term, if combined with the UN ground troops, it 
may be the best option on the table yet. 
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